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THE PHENOMENA OF TRUSTING AND
RELATIONAL ONTOLOGIES
My aim in this essay is to show connections between the
phenomena of trusting and some types of ontology, specifically of
relational ontologies. The commerce between trustings' phenomena
and ontologies goes both ways. Insofar as the phenomena fit the
ontologies, the phenomena serve to confirm the ontologies. Insofar
as the ontologies suggest what to look for as phenomena, and how to
interpret phenomena, the ontologies contribute to the understanding
of trust, within the hermeneutic circle. With baseball pitches and the
umpire's call, an accurately called strike depends not only on the
trajectory of the ball but aiso on the double frame of the batter's
stance and the plate's plane and outline--so baseball cognoscenti tell
me; analogously, trust gets recognized accurately--a prelude to its
being evaluated--not only on the basis of the intentional act, but also
on the basis of the dimensions according to which it is charted. For
trust, I use the term "dimensions" to suggest that greater or less trust
is not to be charted along just one axis; the particular shape of a
person's trusting requires more than one dimension.
Among relational ontologies I will take a look at some feminist
thought, the thought of Martin Buber, and the thought of Gabriel
Marcel.
I offer only a sketch of the phenomena of trust. While I myself
recognize four dimensions of trusting (reliance-trusting; I-thou
trusting, security-trusting, and openness-trusting), in this essay I will
treat only two of the four: reliance trust and I-Thou trusting.
RELIANCE TRUST
To rely is first of all to expect: it is to count on something
happening, and to take appropriate steps to deal with that future
outcome. To trust is, in most usages, to expect what is also desired,
or what is a good for me or for another. But to rely is not merely to
have an expectation. It is also to act on an expectation, or at least to
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be disposed to aet on an expeetation.1
Because I think it more conceptuaJly and experientialJy fruitful. I
choose to begin analyzing trust in terms of acting on expeetations,
rather than to begin by taking trusting as a propositional attitude. or as
a kind of believing, or as acting as if, especially acting as if I believed.2
Initially I set aside reliance on things. and focus on relying on
persons. I also initially set aside two contexts that often figure
prominently in reflection on trust, the involuntary reliance of the infant
and the highly specific and usually sanctioned relationships of
promising between adults that is known as a contract. I take as my
paradigm of reliance-trusting a dealing between adults that is neither
contractual nor involuntary.
With persans, a key feature of trusting is that of appealing to
the good will of another. There is a difference between relying on
natural processes and relying on persons. I can relyon salt to season
and not to poison, but this is different from relying on my cook to
season and not to poison. With nature I am expecting and counting
on processes to continue as they have been. With persans I am
sometimes counting on someone's good will. or at least lack of ill will,
1Expectation. and acting on an expectation. is central to the way trust
is defined by Annette Baier, IITrust and Anti-TrustU Ethics 96 (January 1986):
231-260, and by Bernard Barber, The Logic and Limits 01 Trust (New
Brunswick: Rutgers, 1983). It is also central to understanding religious faith
as trust. as Jaroslav Pelikan surveys the matter in ·Faith," The Encyclopedia
01 Religion (New York: Macmillan. and London: Collier Macmillan, 1987),
5:252.
2Trust understood as acting as tf is the analysis favored by Richard
Swinburne, Faith and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). See also
John King-Farlow and William Christensen on faith and hypotheses in "Faith·-
and Faith in Hypotheses,u Religious Studies 7 (June 1971): 113-124.
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towards me.3
But trusting is not merely a matter of expecting and counting on
what is desired from someone else, and aoting with hope in light of
. that expectation. 4 Something else is needed: letting help. To trust a
person is to desire and expeet and aet so as to enable another freely
to help me and thus so as to increase a kind of likelihood that the
other will help me.5
To aet trustingly is to aet or refrain from aeting so as to let
someone help and thereby to increase the likelihood that the other
will help obtain what I want or need. How do I let help and thereby
inerease this likelihood? How do I act so as to have another's helping
3Annette Baier contrasts trusting others and merely relying on them.
Trusting involves another's good will or at least minimal iII will, whereas merely
relying counts on only "their dependable habits or dependably exhibited fear,
anger, or other motives compatible with iII will toward one. or on motives not
directed on one at all. . .. We" all depend on one another's psychology in
countless ways, but this is not yet to trust them.UTrusting can be betrayed;
other reliances are disappointed. Baier, "Trust and Antitrust,.. Ethics 96
(January 1986): 234-235.
40n hope as a conjoining of desire and estimated possibility see my A
Philosophy of Human Hope (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 29-32.
5Suspicion is defined as parallel to reliance-trust. To be suspicious is
to fear harm, that is, to think that harm is possible, and to desire that it not
oeeur (or that it not have occurred)--harm due to ill will. indifference, or
incompetenee--and · therefore is to -be disposed to take preventive or
proteetive or risk-minimizing measures, such as by removing a good from
another's range of acling. To act wilh suspicion or to act warily is to resist
vulnerability to someone's iII will, negligence, or incompetence. This primary
sense of suspicion is based on a person's reliability; a thing's reliability is
derivative: to be suspieious of something is to resist vulnerability to
somethingts lack of reliable funetioning.
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me be an effect of my acting?6 I can affect this likelihood by entrusting
or by not preventing or by not discouraging another's initiative. I
afford an opportunity to help. I allow a good to be within the causal
range of another's action. I commit or entrust; or at least I do not
withdraw.
Furthermore, trust is often specific and delimited in the matter
or good that is entrusted and in what outcomes are expected and
desired. Such specificities can have a range, established by
discretion extended or discretion withheld. A parent reHes on a baby
sitter to perform some specific services for his or her children,
explicitly excluding others; yet even after instructions, much is left to
the sitter's discretion.
So far, analyzing trust as reliance takes trusting to involve a set
of four factors: there is the I who entrust, the other who is relied upon,
the matter or good entrusted, and the outcome expected and
desired, with varying degrees of discretion.7
There is a fifth factor, the basis of trust. The basis for my
trusting a person may be what I know about the person: a person's
competence, knowledge, and skilI; or a person's character and
general good will; or a person's pledge or promise given to me.
61 can of course connive. maneuver and manipulate, threaten or bribe.
But if manipulative or fear-engendering reasons for trusting or accepting trust
were to be disclosed to another, this would reduce the prospect of my being
helped; Annette Baier makes this point. There are, however, borderline
cases where this does not happen. In a relationship characterized by
extremes of domination and submission. I could perhaps tell the submissive
person why I expect him to help. and he would nonetheless help. I tell him he
is my tool, and he agrees merely to be used.
7 There is another feature, to be explored elsewhere, but one that
seems essential to analysis of trust: vUlnerability. Someone will be hurt,
deprived, wounded if the expectation is not fulfilled. if what is entrusted is
neglected or damaged. The one who entrusts a good is not indifferent to a
felicitous outcome. Annette Baier thinks that vulnerability is an essential
feature of non-contractual trust. "Trust." she writes. "is reliance on others'
competence and willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one cares
about which are entrusted to their care." "Trust and Anti-Trust. 11 259.
Whenever there is trusting. it is possible that harm may come.
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These would be what it is about the person that count as a reason for
me to entrust a matter to the person. There mayaiso be non-personal
factars that support my entrusting a matter to someone, such as
biochemical features of myself or of that other person or of other
persans, or the kind of social role I have, as when I delegate a matter
to a subordinate. 8 In trusting a thing, similar factars, except for
character and good will, give a basis for reliance. With both persons
and things, such personal and non-personal factars constitute the
fifth element, the ubecause", involved in reliance trusting. The five
elements are, therefore, the subject trusting, the one trusted, the
matter or good entrusted or otherwise subject to being affected by
the one trusted, the outcome desired and expected, and the basis for
the trusting.
Acting on someone's recommendation illustrates these five
elements. Someone new to a city trusts a dentist, that she will
probably correctly diagnose the source of the pain and provide
effective therapy, and the newcomer does so trust because an· old
friend of his has recommended this dentist and this old friend is
shrewd and experienced in health matters, and has hirnself been
skillfully treated by this dentist. The person new to the city is the one
who trusts; the dentist is the person trusted; the good entrusted is
the health of teeth; the future outcome expected is at least an
arresting of pain and stabilizing of a deteriorating situation. The
reason for the trusting is the recommendation of the friend. To
generalize: in reliance-trust, one person expects and desires and
makes it or lets it be possible that another take care of some good,
with a delimited range of ends in view; I rely on you to take care of this,
to this end, for these reasons. Ta put the five elements schematically:
X trusts Y with Z, and has in view the outcome W, because of R. Thus,
reliance-trust is, if I may coin the term, pentadie.
8Another factor can be even the person's likeness to someone whom I
already do trust ("He reminds me of my unclell), as Laurence Thomas has
suggested. See "Trust, Affirmation, and Moral Character: A Critique of
Kantian Morality,1I in his Identity, Character, and Mora/ity: Essays in Moral
Psych%gy(Cambridge, MIT Press, 1991),254 n. 8.
108
I·THOU TRUST
A second dimension of trust is what I call1-Thou trust.9 It might
also be termed intersubjective trust, personal trust, relational trust,
intimacy trust.
An approximate conception of I-Thou trust can be developed
by extrapolation from several features of reliance-trusting. Reliance-
trusting includes five elements, as we have seen. 1-Thou trust, on the
other hand, is approximated insofar as expectations become
unspecific, insofar as the good entrusted is the very self of the person
who does the entrusting, and insofar as the reason for the trusting is
the very person of the other trusted. Instead of X trusting Y with Z for
W because of R, we have X trusts Y with X, because of Y: I trust you
with myself because of you. I-thou trust is not pentadic but dyadic.
The movement from specific outcomes expected to a lack of
speci1ic expectations underscores the way in which reliance-trusting
is instrumental and I-thou trusting is not. In reliance-trusting I rely on
another to do for me. I expect the other to act to further my interests,
to serve myends. Of course I mayaiso, or alternately, expect that the
one I trust will serve not me but others, will meet not my needs but the
needs of those I care about. But whether what I care directly about is
my interests or those of someone else, the one trusted is expected
not to neglect those interests. The instrumental context is clear when
I look 10r a substitute: if this person cannot take care of my car, I will
find someone else who can. In reliance-trusting the other whom I trust
is replaceable, fungible at least in principle, even though in my
circumstances there may be no substitute actually at hand. 10 In I-thou
trust, however, the other is not replaceable.
Intimate trust between friends is one kind of I·thou dyadic trust.
There may be relationships wherein I essentially judge it good that this
friend be who she is; I am glad that this person lives, but not just for my
9 Martin Buber's land Thou is a principal inspiration for this proposal;
the intersubjective philosophy of Gabriel Marcel is also influential here.
10Replaceability does not imply that 'the usefulness of the one I trust
is just episodic; his or her utility may be continuous, embedded in
professional skills or personal character.
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sake. In such a non-instrumental context, to trust a person ean be to
bring to that person more of myself, where "self" says more than
features about me or interests I have. Indeed, my friend may not have
eerlain skills, or may even lack eertain character-traits, and in dealing
her I do not expeet help for certain of my interests; I may and should
actually refrain from relying on my friend in some matters.
But I do bring myself--as contrasted with my interests--to this
person. I open up to her, and take a ehance on what may come of
this. While to my doctor I entrust my health, to my friend I entrust my
self. I do not withhold my self. I bring to my friend all that I consider
close to my very self--mind, heart, body, history, weaknesses,
strengths, tears and hopes. In this trust of friendship I do not have a
specific outcome in mind. What may result may go beyond eaeh
personls (at least conseious) ends. At its highest, this form of trust is
troth--an etymological cousin of trust. 11 The plausibility of this kind of
trusting is closely linked to the plausibiUty of a loving that is neither
altruistie nor egoistic but appreciative.12
Another way of making clear the contrast between relianee-
trusting and I-Thou trusting is to contrast congeniality with intimacy.13
If a relationship is one of congeniality, it is the effect on me that I am
interested in,14 perhaps as part of the reciproeally enhaneing effects
on both of us. We stimulate each other in ways psychological, sexual,
11 Trust, truth, and troth go back to the Old English treowe,
trustworthy. The reconstructed Indo-European root is DERU, firm, solid,
steadfast; hence, "tree". The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, edited by William Morris (New York: American Heritage Publishing
Company, and Boston: Houghton MlffUn Company, 1973), 1512.
121 explore these two kinds of trust, and the contrast between
relationships of utility and those of appreciation, in my A Philosophy of
Human Hope.
13Here 1 employ a contrast between impersonal congeniality and
personal intimacy developed by J. F. M. Hunter in Thinking About Sex and
Love (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 85-93. It is like Aristotle's
contrast between friendships based on what is useful or agreeable and
friendships wherein each values the other for the other's own sake.
14Hunter speaks of these as the output, the performance.
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intellectual, and aesthetic, through conversation, laughter, and
silences. Vet I lose interest if such effects wane. The reJationship
"alters when it alteration finds.·
Intimacy is something else. In an intimate I-Thou relationship, I
remain concerned even if the exchanges between us change.
Indeed, I pay attention to even her foibles and imperfeetions, not
because I judge them excellent, but because they are hers. I am
interested in her, I care for her, and this kind of interest and care is not
the same as my interest in her qualities.
Trust based on useful congeniality declines as people become
less useful or less agreeable. I-Thou trust is of a different dimension. I
am open in my whole person to the whole person of this other, and I
am not wary lest some hope or fear of mine come within another's ken.
I trust the other, not for contributing to any or to every outcome I am
interested in having happen; rather, I trust the other with all that I am. If
there is a facet of my life that she is not in touch with, it is not because I
withhold it; it just has not come up. The total acceptance of intimacy
trust is different from an ability to rely on the totality of every trait of a
person for effecting what I want or need.
I am claiming, therefore, that I-thou trusting is neither a form of
reliance-trusting nor is it reducible to reliance-trusting, although
reliance-trusting usually accompanies. I-thou trusting. Nor am I
claiming that I-thou trust is common; it may indeed be rare, episodic, at
least in its fullest forms. And of course context is needed to enable
anyone to distinguish in the concrete between these two dimensions
of trust.
While a fuller exposition of the phenomena of trusting would
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include security-trust 15 and openness-trust, I limit myself to these
sketches of reliance trust and I-Thou trust, and now turn to relational
ontologies.
. RELATIONAL ONTOLOGIES
Ontology, in its root sense, is an account of what is real. 16
Some ontologies propose to be regional--of the human person, for
example, or of the subject-matter of the physical sciences. Other
ontologies propose to be global, of the entire so-called "furniture of
the universe. 1I Some ontological questions are questions of
categorizing or typing: is the human mind the same type of reality as
the human body? Other ontological questions are about the status of
something alleged to be real but not patently so--self or soul, for
example, or other minds, or God. Often the method of ontology is to
take some type of entity as the benchmark case of what is real, and
compare other phenomena to that benchmark in a process of
analogical thinking.
15Security trust differs trom reliance trust. It is a sense of being
basically secure, at-home, upheld in my basic seil. It is not a confidence that
my particular projects will prosper. It is rather a sense that I belong, am
accepted, am OK. I sense ground beneath my feet. Security trust contrasts
with Heideggerian Angst. It also contrasts with those strietly limited
particular torms ot being seeure where I am secure trom or secure against:
"l'm safe as long as I don't go outside." Seeurity-trust is not eosmie, but has
a partieular here to it.
I find Mareel's deseription of fundamental existential assurance a
helpful farmula for seeurity trust. Fundamental existential assurance, he
writes, is "the affirmation of an original link, one eould even say an umbilieal
link, whieh unites the human being, not to the world in general, which would
mean nothing, but to a eertain determinate ambianee whieh is as eoncrete as
a cocoon or a nest" (Joan Nowotny's more detailed and literal translation of a
passage from Pour une sagesse tragique et son au-dela, 67). The published
translation is in Tragic Wisdom and Beyond (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973),38.
160ntology is in some contexts also used as a synonym for
metaphysics.
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Some ontologies are explicitly relational.17 My core meaning of
"relational ontology" is one in which the linkage of one with another,
especially of self with another, is the benchmark from which what
counts as real is measured. The Aristotelian gospel says "In the
beginning was substance, ousia." The Cartesian gospel says "In the
beginning was self, ego:' The gospel of the ontologies I consider
now says "In the beginning was the between, das
Zwischenmenschliche". More basic than Dasein is Dazwischen.18
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE, THREE TYPES OF
RELATION, AND BUBER1S I-THOU.
I begin my treatment of the relational with feminist philosopher
Caroline Whitbeck's argument for a relational ontology. She argues
against an ontology that sees self and other as presumed to be
different in features and then presumed to be opposed. While her
obvious target is the sexual differentiation of male and female as, in
the logical sense, complements, for my purposes her most important
target is the philosophical convention held by some that self and
other are in opposition and cannot fail to have interests that compete.
She herself recommends an ontology Hbased on an understanding of
the relation of self and other as a relation between analogous beings.
. .. Therefore, the distinction between the self and an other does not
turn on construing the other as opposite; another distinct being may,
and usually does, possess some of the same characteristics as the
17The terms "relational"--and "relation" and "relationship"--have
become as helpful or unhelpful as the terms "being" and "Being".
18Were I presenting a more extended study, I would begin with, for
example, the explicitly relational metaphysics of Harold Oliver in A Relational
Mstaphysic(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981) and in Relatedness: Essays
in Metaphysics and Theology (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984).
Finding Oliver's understanding of relation limited to what John Macmurray
caUs the mechanical and the organic, I am led to what Macmurray called the
specific form of the personal. The relational Thomistic metaphysics of W.
Norris Clarke is very suggestive at this point, but what he means by personal
substance in relation encompasses both the I-It and the I-Thou relations of
Martin Buber; I want to emphasize the distinction between these two manners
of interpersonal acting. See W. Norris Clarke, "To Be Is To Be Substance-in-
Relation,· Metaphysies as Foundation: Essays in Honor ollvor Leelere
(Albany: SUNY, 1993), 164-181.
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self." She resists the framing of ontological issues in ways that would
"deny the existence of others, reduce all others to the self--'one soul
in two bodies,'--or ... interpret the other as mere material for 'the seifis
designs."19
Whitbeck's thesis supports a point which I have argued
elsewhere, that interactional relations can be understood in three
ways: as adversarial, as neutral, or as·supportive. 20 Thus, the other
can be opposed, resistant to my aims; the other can be neutral and
"mere material for the seifis designs"; or the other can be supportive,
an ally with parallel or converging purposes.21
But I further propose that the trifold distinguishing of self-other
relations into the adversarial, the neutral, and the allied obtains within
what Martin Buber termed the I-It relationship. The I-It relationship is
characterized by, to use Buber's terminology, experiencing and
using. An other opposes my purposes, or is perhaps malleable to my
aims and powers, or has energies and aims allied to mine--all this for
the sake of some goal-seeking activity. Relationships of utility,
sometimes called subject-object relationships and regardless of
whether they obtain in the sphere of knowing or in the sphere of
choosing, are types of I-It relationship.
The I-Thou relationship is of a different sorte Where the I-It
relationship is selective and goal-directed, the I-Thou relationship is
not so restricted. Where in the I-It relation controlling or being
controlled is an issue, the 1-Thou relationship arises by both grace and
will. The I-Thou relationship is a way of relating to human beings,
nature, and human "creations," in a word-deed involving the whole
19Whitbeck, Caroline, "A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology," in
Beyond Domination: New Perspectives an Wamen and Philosophy, edited by
Carol Gould, New Feminist Perspectives (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman &
Allanheld, 1984),81,82.
20A Philosophy o(Human Hope, 157.
21 1wonder whether perhaps there has been some segue from logical
opposition and logical complementarity to interpersonal opposition and
antagonism, supported by some social commonplaces--the war between the
sexes, for example--or by Hegelian philosophy.
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being, a dealing beyond using and experiencing, Le., beyond goal-
directed activities, and "before" separating out (abstracting) qualities
or features of the other. It is a word-deed where there is choosing and
being chosen, where there is activity approaching passivity. It is a
word-deed in which I become awhole being, while a person engages
in I-It relationships only partially. Thus even the self of the I-It
relationship is different from the self of the 1-Thou relationship.
NEGATIVE ONTOLOGY: BUBER'
Martin Buber's understanding of I-Thou relation may indeed
point towards an ontology, but apointer is not a description, let alone
an ontology formulated in a conventional way. When one tries to
elaborate Buber's I-Thou relationship as an account of what is real,
one comes up with negative results: Buber's ontology is a negative
ontology. What I mean by this is that the customary and stable
language of ontology is the language of I-It, of disjunctions and
classifications and complement classes; mind is--or is not-··body, for
example. The I-Thou relationship has a conceptual instability. One
reason for this is that I-Thou relationship is more episodic than
continuous when compared to I-It dealings.
Because I-It is less episodic, understanding favors the I-It. As
Michael Theunissen put it, quoting Buber: IIIYou can make yourself
understood with others only over it', for it alone--this is how one has to
flesh out the rationale--guarantees an identity for the different
individual consciousnesses, thanks to that identity that persists
through time. . .. Now,' the impermanent Thou-world is the negation
of all this. It is 'unreliable', 'without density', 'without duration',
'incapable of being surveyed', not a possible object of intersubjective
understanding."22
The negative result of trying to extrude a conventional
ontology out of I-Thou relationships suggests that ontologies may be,
to use the scholastic terminology concerning speech about God, not
22Theunissen, Michael, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of
Husser/, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, translated by Christopher Macann
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 328; in the Kaufmann translation of land
Thou, 83-84.
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only of a positive but also of a negative and of a supereminent sorte
Buber's I-Thou intimates a via negativa ontology.
MARCEL'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Marcel's contributions to relational ontologies and the
understanding of the phenomena of trusting fall under three
headings: intersubjective ontology; the concrete approach to
ontology; and the way this is embodied in his analysis of fidelity.
Marcel identifies his ontology as intersubjective, if we can take
his answer .to the question whether being is intersubjectivity as
sufficient warrant.23 Self is tied to other in an underlying unity which is
not a totality. The meta-problematical, or the realm of mystery as
Marcel caUs it, is akin to via negativa and via supereminentiae in
ontology. Vet we should not over-inventory the product of such an
ontology, mindful that Marcel has told us, "It has become increasingly
evident to me that the claim to 'encapsule the universe' in a set of
formulas which are more or less rigorously related, is absurd."24
There are vivid similarities between Marcel's concrete approach
to ontology and a feminist approach to ontology. Consider this
passage from feminist metaphysician Catherine Witt: "The feminine
voice is distinguished by two features: the tendency to view
interpersonal relations as a basic feature of reality and a high degree
of concern for the details of a situation or problem. Feminine
reasoning is concrete rather than abstract; it does not operate by
smoothing away the details of a problem but tries to accommodate
them in their variety and richness. Feminine reasoning assurnes
23"1 concern myself with being only in so far as I have a more or less
distinct consciousness 01 the underlying unity which ties me to other beings
01 whose reality 1already have a preliminary notion." Mystery 0' Being, I,
223.
24Creative Fidelity(New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1964),60,
in "An Outline of a Concrete Philosophy.·
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relatedness rather than individuality in its descriptions of situations.1I25
One could substitute "Marcellianll for "feminine": the Marcellian voice
is characterized by concern for interpersonal relations and concrete
details of a situation. Separated selves conceived according to
universal patterns is the style neither of much feminist philosophy nor
of Marcel.
In a passage Marcel himself viewed as an epiphany, he wrote
that the formula UBeing as the place of fidelity" Ithas for me the
inexhaustible inspiration of a musical theme.1I It suggests "access to
ontology."26 1take the aceess he suggests to be twofold. One is that
analysis of fidelity may yield the conviction that to consider fidelity in
terms of problem, that is, as an issue or question towards which one
ean take the view of a dispassionate outside evaluator, is to miss what
is central to fidelity, the realm of the meta-problematic. The other is
that the meta-problematic realm--I dare to intrude the term IIrealm"
here---ineludes both the self that is assessing the matter and the
veiled presenee of a Thou tnat is not empirical in the usual sense. For
Marcel, refleetion on fidelity is the path beyond the problematic and
beyond the objective, into a territory not mappable by the techniques
of conventional ontology.
Mareel's analysis of fidelity is a ease par exeellence of a
eoncrete approach to ontology, and his analysis suggests a major
eontribution to reflection on trust. Fidelity is Marcel's word for what I
would eall intersubjeetive or I-Thou trustworthiness. To be a person of
fidelity is to be a person who is present to another. Words waver in
the attempt to say what fidelity is, and the temptation to nail it down in
the terminology of I-It is strong. Fidelity is better approached
negatively, via remotionis; fidelity is not at its core the reliability of a
person who has eommitted himself or herself to "perseverance in a
eertain goal,1I especially out of regard for duty. Marcel calls such
25Witt. Charlotte. "Feminist Metaphysics.1I in A Mind 01 One's Own:
Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. edited by Louise M. Antony and
Charlotte Witt (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1993). 281.
26Marcei. Gabriel. Being and Having: An Existentialist Diary (New
York: Harper & Row. 1965. originally 1949).41.
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resolute readiness to work and to serve "constancytl.27 While the
person of fidelity is indeed appropriately constant, he or she is also
present. The faithful friend is present for the other, as for thou; the
faithful friend is there for me because of me. The friend is not fulfilling
some duty, and is not motivated by either a sense of seit or a sense of
honor or a sense of duty or adesire to be blameless. He or she is not
intent upon passing some test. On the eontrary, 'the notion that the
behavior of a faithful friend is subject to assessment by some neutral
observer is absurd.
Fidelity has a spontaneity that ean be neither coereed nor self-
determinedly willed. As I read Mareei, fidelity arises between myself
and anotheri and continues as a reasonable and good relationship
only insofar as it has a neeessary link to a Thou not subjeet to the
vicissitudes that would otherwise eall fidelity into question.
A person of fidelity ereates a self. As Marcel put the matter:
The fact is that when I eommit myself, I grant in prineiple that
the eommitment will not again be put in question. And it is
elear that this aetive volition not to question something
again, intervenes as an essential element in the
determination of what in fact will be the ease. It at onee bars
a eertain number of possibiJities, it bids me invent a eertain
modus vivendi whieh I would otherwise be preeluded from
envisaging. Here there appears in a rudimentary form what I
eall creative fidelity. My behavior will be eompletely eolored
. by this aet embodying the deeision that the eommitment will
not again be questioned. The possibility whieh has been
barred or denied will thus be demoted to the rank of a
temptation.28
In relegating some possibility to the status of a temptation and In
setting myself to eontribute to what will be the ease, in a eertain way I
ereate my self. I see Marcel implying here that in the self-ereation of
fidelity, I trust God that I will not make junk.
27Vet eonstaney is not opposed to fidelity; indeed "eonstaney may be
viewed as the rational skeleton of fidelity." Creative Fidelity, 153.
28Creative Fidelity, 162.
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I suspect that the possibility of self·creation in I·Thou terms
would appeal to the concern in feminist philosophy for self-creation in
some terms other than those of I-It, of experiencing and using. To
make myself present is different from making myself reliable.
The contrast between fidelity and constancy turns not just on
the spontaneity of fidelity and the self·centered resoluteness of
constancy, but also on the person of fidelity being judged by another
to be a faithful friend. The faithful friend is not the person who has his
own dutiful reasons for being constant, but is the person, Marcel
writes, "who does not fail me, someone who stands up to whatever
the circumstances may bring; he [or she] does not slip away, but we
find hirn [or her] there when we are in difficulty." 29 In terms of my
dimensions of trust, I judge this friend to be I·Thou trustworthy.
The distinction I make between I·Thou trust and refiance-trust
permits us to recognize that this faithful friend will nevertheless
decline to accept the entrusting of some goods, even if maximal
discretion is afforded. A truly faithful friend can say: You'll have to
laarn to do that yourself; or: You'll have to get someone else, because
taking care of something like that is beyond me.
Thus the good-wiU-towards-me of reliance-trust is made more
sophisticated by Marcel's yoking and contrast of fidelity and
constancy. The reliable person can have seJf-consistency, a sense of
duty, a "constancy", as motive; the Marcellian I·Thou trustworthy
person has presence to the other, irreducible to reliance.
CONCLUSION
Since reliance-trust is not the whole story of trusting, it is
unhelpful always to imagine trusting as better to the extent that a
person entrusts greater goods with ever greater discretion, even to
the point of the greatest good with maximal discretion. The truly
faithful friend may decline the entrusting of some of the greatest
29Creative Fidelity, 154. I find in a line of Simone Weil the spirit of
such fidelity: IIThe love of our neighbor in all its fullness simply means being
able to say to hirn: 'What are you going through?'" Quoted in Notre Dame
Magazine, May 1980.
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goods, and gently but firmly turn 'them back. Sometimes the best
triend is one who enables another to do tor seff. Thus the most
intelligent way to trust is not solely to ambition better and more
accurate reliance. It is also to be open to I-Thou trust, the latter being
more a matter of presence to a friend than a matter of instrumental
caring for goods a friend lets me take care of. Indeed, sometimes I do
weil to be suspicious of the well-intentioned assistance offered even
by a faithful friend.
The I·Thou ontology suggested by Buber and Marcel is a
corrective against considering that human interpersonal relations are
accurately understood when they have been analyzed solely in terms
of using and being used, even when the using is reciprocal, fair, and
knowingly consensual. As some feminist philosophers have argued,
one is not better as a person if he or she enters more-carefully-
formulated contracts. Nor is better trusting a matter of more
discretion, because to leave much to another's discretion is to trust
that other still for what that person can do and has chosen to do: that
person is simply more widely reliably useful. There is, however, more
to genuine human relationships than usefulness. And so there seem
to be some phenomena tor which the I-Thou relational model is better
suited--better suited tor expressing some dimensions of trust and
better suited for keeping a person on the lookout for some non-
reliance cases of trust. An I-Thou relational ontology, despite or
perhaps because of its character as a negative ontology, offers a
better fit with a trusting that is not just instrumental reliance.
I return to Marcells dictum, and ask: How does fidelity give
access to ontology? One access I see is that fidellty, as more
inclusive than constancy, suggests that an ontology of the person
which has categories open only to useful or resolute constancy is an
ontology that too thinly describes the powe~s and realizations of
which people are capable and of which they are, indeed, in need.
Another access is suggested by Marcel. He suggests that fidelity, at
least that of the highest sort, cannot be understood without some
appeal to, glimpse of, and backing from, a One who enables fidelity to
make sense. As I read Marcel, fidelity crosses into absurdity or at least
in some cases into wrongness not only when it is understood as mere
constancy but also insofar as the faithful person does not "extend an
120
infinite credit to'l God. 30 Now this is a Une of exploration typically
ontologieal, even if it would proceed via negativa.
I myself think that the phenomena of trust can be a starting
point tor consideration of some traditional ontol09ical questions, and
that the more promising routes for doing so are not Cartesian but
relational. But identifying the ontological conditions of possibility for
the fidelity of which Marcel speaks is a much larger topic, in Marcel
scholarship and in philosophy generally.31
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30Creative Fidelity, 167.
31 1am indebted to Julie McDonald for bibliographical help on feminist
ontology, and 10 Elizabeth Linehan for clarifications of some of my ideas.
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